Megan's Law: The New Jersey Supreme Court
Navigates Uncharted Waters
The New Jersey Legislature responded with unprecedented
speed to several high-profile violent sex crimes against children1 by
enacting the most comprehensive sex offender legislation in the
nation.2 The law is named after Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old girl
who was sexually assaulted and murdered by a neighbor.' The alleged murderer, thirty-three-year-old Jesse Timmendequas, had a
history of sexual offenses against children and lived with two other
convicted sex offenders on the same street as the Kanka family.4
Megan's murder occurred only a few months after another young
girl, Amanda Wengert, was murdered5 by a twenty-year-old neighbor who had a history of sexual offenses against children.6
The Legislature and the Governor responded to the public
fervor that followed these crimes by swiftly enacting the nine bills
known as Megan's Law.7 The principal elements of Megan's Law
provide for: (1) the registration of sex offenders and the creation
of a central registry;8 (2) community notification;9 (3) notification
procedures for the release of certain offenders; 10 (4) extended
I See Ivette Mendez, Sex Offender Measures Go to Governor,THE STAR-LEDGER (N.J.),
October 21, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Mendez, Measures Go to Governor] (noting that the
enactment of Megan's law occurred within three months of the rape and murder of a
seven-year-old girl); see also, Ivette Mendez, Sex Offender Bills Enacted by Whitman, THE
STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), November 1, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Mendez, Bills Enacted] (stating that Megan's Law had been "placed on the fast-track").
2 Kathy Barrett Carter, Retroactive Sex Crime Law Raises Thorny Issue, THE STARLEDGER (N.J.), January 15, 1995, at 1.
s Michael Booth, Constitutional Challenge Readied to "Megan's Law," 138 N.J.L.J.
1703, 1703 (1994); see also Ivette Mendez, "Megan's Law". 10 Sex Offender Bills Clear
Senate, THE STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), October 4, 1994, at 1.
4 Guy Sterling, Death Penalty Call in Megan Murder, THE STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), Oct.
20, 1994, at 1, 12.
5 Mendez, Measures Go to Governor,supra note 1, at 1.
6 Mendez, Bills Enacted, supra note 1, at 10.
7 Mendez, Bills Enacted, supra note 1, at 1. Shortly after Megan's murder, the Legislature began the task of revising New Jersey's sex offender laws. See Mendez, Measures Go to Governor,supra note 1, at 1. The entire process took less than three months.
Id. The first package of bills was introduced on August 10, 1994. Id. On October 3,
1994, the Senate unanimously passed 10 bills targeting sex offenders. Mendez, supra
note 3, at 1. On October 20, 1994, the Assembly approved seven bills targeting sex
offenders. Mendez, Measures Go to Governor,at 1, 18. On October 31, 1994 Governor
Whitman signed into law nine bills comprising "Megan's Law." Mendez, Bills Enacted,
supra note 1, at 1.
8 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to -5 (West 1995).

9 Id. §§ 2C:7-6 to -11.

10 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.53a (West Supp. 1995).
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terms of incarceration for sexually-violent predators;' (5) the consideration of murder of a child under fourteen as an aggravating
factor in death penalty proceedings;'" (6) involuntary civil commitment of dangerous criminals;' 3 (7) lifetime community supervision;" (8) the collection of a DNA sample from sex offenders for
the creation of a DNA database and data bank;1 5 and (9) no "good
time" credits for sex offenders who refuse treatment.1 6
New Jersey's response to the danger posed by violent sexual
offenders is not entirely novel.1 7 At least forty states have adopted
legislation targeting sex offenders."8 Moreover, the federal governN.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7 (West 1995).
Id. § 2C:II-3c(4)(k).
13 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.4 (West 1995).
14 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6.4 (West 1995).
15 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.20 (West Supp. 1995).
16 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:47-8 (West 1995).
17 Cf WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.130, 4.24.550, 71.09.010-.230 (West Supp.
1996). Like Megan's Law, the Washington law requires sex offenders to register
(§ 9A.44.130), permits law enforcement agencies to notify the public when necessary
(§ 4.24.550), and provides for involuntary civil commitment of violent sexual
predators (§ 71.09.010 to-.230). Id.
Other states have also enacted laws requiring registration and, in some cases,
allowing for some type of notification. See Lynn Smith, DialingUp a Weapon Against
Molestation, LA. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1994, at El (commenting that the California Legislature passed a law to create a 900 telephone number to provide private citizens access
to a state registry of sex offenders); John Sanko, Bill Aims to Unmask Sex Offenders,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, March 15, 1995, at 4A (reporting that the Colorado Legislature is
considering a bill that would allow residents to access sex offender registry); Child
Molester Registy Spurs Questions, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 10, 1994, at B03 (describing Indiana statute known as "Zachary's Law," which created a sex offender registry,
the information of which is available to schools and other organizations that work
with children); see also infra note 18 (listing examples of similar statutes in various
jurisdictions). But seeJoe Hallinan, Sex Abuser Registy Laws Rarely Used Nationally, THE
STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), Nov. 25, 1994, at 58 (reporting that although approximately 10
states have some notification provisions, few residents inquire about sex offenders;
usually the interest is sparked after highly publicized crimes).
18 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-200 to -203 (repl. 1994); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 12.63.010, 18.65.087 (1995); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821, 13-3825 (Supp.
1995); AwK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-901 to -909 (Michie repl. 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 290-290.7 (West Supp. 1996); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-412.5 (West Supp.
1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102r (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11
§ 4120 (repl. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.21-.23 (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-9-44.1 (Michie 1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8301 to -8311 (Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 730, para. 150/1-150/9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-121 to -13 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4901 to -4910 (Supp. 1993); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.510-.540 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 15:540-:549 (West Supp. 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11001-11004
(West Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22C, § 37 (West 1994); MIcH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 28.730 (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (West 1995);
MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-1 to -19 (Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.600 (Vernon
Supp. 1996); Morr. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-501 to -508 (1995); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
"1
12
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ment has responded to the national concern over violent sex

crimes against children by enacting the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act.' 9
The laws adopted by other states, however, are not as far-reaching
or as prone to constitutional challenge as the New Jersey law.2°
Since its enactment on October 31, 1994, several challenges to
the law have been brought by sex offenders in both state and federal courts. The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently upheld
Megan's Law in the controversial decision Doe v. Poritz.2 ' Concurrently, the federal district court invalidated the notification provisions of Megan's Law as unconstitutional in Artway v. Attorney
22
General of New Jersey.
This Comment focuses on the registration and notification
components of Megan's Law. Part I provides an overview of these
two key components of the statute and explores the goals behind

each provision. Part II profiles the sex offender and illustrates the
problems encountered by the criminal justice system in dealing
with violent sexual criminals. Part III examines the numerous constitutional issues raised by the challenges to Megan's Law and dis§§ 207.151 to -.157 (Michie Supp. 1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:12 (Supp.
1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11 (West 1995); N.D. CErNr. CODE § 12.1-32-15
(Supp. 1995); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.01-.99 (Anderson repl. 1993); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581-587 (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.594-.602
(1995); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-16 (1994); S.D. CODIID LAWS ANN. §§ 22-22-31 to -41
(Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to -108 (Supp. 1995); TEX. REv. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1 (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (Supp.
1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-298.1 to -298.3, 19.2-390.1 (Michie repl. 1995); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.130, 4.24.550, 71.09.010-.230 (West Supp. 1996); W. VA.
CODE §§ 61-8F-I to -8 (Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 175.45 (West Supp. 1995);
Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-19-301 to -306 (1995).

On July 25, 1995, Governor George Pataki of New York signed a law modeled on
New Jersey's Megan's Law. N.Y. Adapts Statute Modeled on Jersey's, THE STAR-LEDGER
(N.J.),July 26, 1995, at 4.
19 SeeJacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexual Violent Offender Registration Program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (1995). The Act encourages states to implement programs requiring registration of sex offenders. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (a)(1).
The individual states must comply by September 13, 1997 to avoid ineligibility for
federal funds. -Id.§ 14071(f). The Act also provides for public notification when it is
necessary to protect the public. Id. § 14071(d).
20 See Carter, supra note 2, at 1, 14. New Jersey is the only state that provides for
notification to law enforcement, schools, day care, youth organizations, and the general public. Id. at 14. New Jersey is only one of six states that require juveniles to
register and one of seven states that requires the sex offender to register for life. Id.
Additionally, the New Jersey law as adopted applies to sex offenders who committed
their crimes prior to the adoption of Megan's Law, raising constitutional issues of ex
post facto punishment. Id.
21 142 N.J. 1, 110-11, 662 A.2d 367, 422-23 (1995).
22 876 F. Supp. 666, 692 (D.N.J. 1995).
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cusses the New Jersey Supreme Court's response to those issues.
Part IV concludes that despite venturing into "uncharted waters, "23
the New Jersey Supreme Court's pragmatic decision salvaged a
well-intentioned but constitutionally infirm Megan's Law that is
both timely and necessary.
I.

THE PURPOSE OF MEGAN'S LAW

Historically, sex offender statutes such as Megan's Law have
developed after highly-publicized violent sex crimes led to public
demands for new laws to better protect society, and particularly
children, from sex offenders.2 4 The public outrage in New'Jersey,
as in other states, arose from a perception that existing laws did not

adequately protect society from dangerous sex offenders. 25 The
New Jersey Legislature enacted Megan's Law in order to protect
23 Doe, 142 N.J. at 109, 662 A.2d at 422. The NewJersey Supreme Court concluded
its opinion by professing that:
We sail on truly uncharted waters, for no other state has adopted such a
far-reaching statute. All other notification statutes apparently make
public notification discretionary on the part of officials; the statute
before us, however, mandates it. Despite the unavoidable uncertainty of
our conclusion, we remain convinced that the statute is constitutional.
To rule otherwise is to find that society is unable to protect itself from
sexual predators by adopting the simple remedy of informing the public
of their presence. That the remedy has a potentially severe effect arises
from no fault of government, or of society, but rather from the nature
of the remedy and the problem; it is an unavoidable consequence of the
compelling necessity to design a remedy.
Id.
24 See, e.g., Hal Quinn, A Law to Curb Sex Offenders, MACLEANS, March 1, 1993, at 21.
Like New Jersey's law, Washington's "Sexually Violent Predator Laws" were enacted in
1990, after Earl Shriner sexually assaulted, mutilated, and attempted to murder a
seven-year-old boy. Id. Shriner had a long history of violent sex crimes and had
served a 10-year sentence for assaulting children. Id.
Californians sought to enact legislation targeting sex offenders after Polly Klass,
age 12, was kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and murdered. Smith, supra note 17, at El.
Among the laws passed in response to Klass's murder was a statute establishing a 900
telephone number that will allow citizens to check names against a database of habitual sex offenders. Id.
Indiana enacted "Zachary's Law" after Christopher Stevens, a convicted child molester, molested and murdered 10-year-old Zachary Snider. Child Molester Registry Spurs
Questions, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 10, 1994, at BO3.
25 See Mendez, Bills Enacted, supra note 1, at 1, 10 (quoting New Jersey Governor
Whitman that Megan's Law "breaks new ground in public protection"); see also David
Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv.
525, 525-38 (1992) (describing public reaction to the inadequacies of sexual offender
laws in the state of Washington after a highly-publicized crime). Broener, a participant of the Task Force created by the Governor of Washington to review the problems
presented by sex offenders, describes the process undertaken by the state to change
its sex offender laws. Id. at 538. The Task Force focused on creating a law that would
close the "gap" in the then-existing laws that allowed a convicted sex offender to be
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society by expanding law enforcement's arsenal for dealing with
habitual sex offenders and by providing parents with the information necessary to protect their children.2 6 At the heart of Megan's
Law lie provisions requiring registration 2 7 and notification.28
A.

Registration

The purpose of registration is to assist law enforcement in
preventing and solving sexual abuse and missing persons cases by
providing law enforcement agencies with immediate access to in29
formation about sex offenders and other dangerous persons.
The Legislature enacted the system of registration in response to
public safety concerns raised by the high risk of recidivism among
sex offenders."0 The statute provides for the creation of a central
registry" and for the sharing of information between the law enforcement agencies of NewJersey, other states, and the federal government. 32 When necessary for the protection of the public, the
statute permits law enforcement agencies to disseminate information regarding a registered sex offender to the public.3 3
Any person convicted, acquitted due to insanity, or adjudireleased into the community after he had repeatedly shown that he was dangerous.
Id. at 546-47.
26 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (stating legislative declaration of purpose for
Megan's Law).
27 Id. §§ 2C:7-1 to -5.
28 Id. §§ 2C:7-6 to -11; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.53a.
29 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1. Specifically, the legislative findings state that:
The Legislature finds and declares:
a. The danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders and offenders who
commit other predatory acts against children, and the dangers posed by
persons who prey on others as a result of mental illness, require a system
of registration that will permit law enforcement officials to identify and
alert the public when necessary for the public safety.
b. A system of registration of sex offenders and offenders who commit
other predatory acts against children will provide law enforcement with
additional information critical to preventing and promptly resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and missing persons.
Id.
30 Id. "Recidivism" is defined as "a tendency to relapse into a previous condition
or mode of behavior; esp.: relapse into criminal behavior." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 983 (9th ed. 1991).
31 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-4(d).
32 Id. § 2C:7-5(a).
33 Id. § 2C:7-5(a). Release of information is to be carried out in accordance with
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-6 to -11 and the guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General. Id.; id. § 2C:7-8(a). For a discussion of the New Jersey Supreme Court's interpretation of the notification provision, see infra notes 51-52, 54-56, 58.
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35
4
cated delinquent in connection with a sex offenses must register.
If a court determines that the offender's conduct may be characterized as repetitive, compulsive behavior, then the registration requirement is imposed even if the offense or conviction occurred
prior to the enactment of Megan's Law.3 6 An offender's failure to
register is classified as a fourth-degree offense.3 7
Persons required to register are notified3 8 and must complete
the registration forms with the designated registering agent.3 9 Sex

34 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-2(b)(1)-(3). The statute defines the following as sex
offenses:
(1) Aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual
contact, kidnapping pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection c. of NJ.S.
2C:13-1 or an attempt to commit any of these crimes if the court found
that the offender's conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive,
compulsive behavior, regardless of the date of the commission of the
offense or the date of conviction;
(2) A conviction, adjudication of delinquency, or acquittal by reason of
insanity for aggravated sexual assault; sexual assault; aggravated criminal sexual contract [sic]; kidnapping pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection c. of NJ.S. 2C:13-1; endangering the welfare of a child by
engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals
of the child pursuant to subsection a. of NJ.S. 2C:24-4; endangering the
welfare of a child pursuant to paragraph (4) of subsection b. of NJ.S.
2C:24-4; luring or enticing pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1993, c.291 (C.
2C:13-6); criminal sexual contact pursuant to NJ.S. 2C:14-3b. if the victim is a minor; kidnapping pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:13-1, criminal restraint
pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:13-2, or false imprisonment pursuant to N.J.S.
2C:13-3 if the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent of the
victim; or an attempt to commit any these enumerated offenses if the
conviction, adjudication of delinquency or acquittal by reason of insanity is entered on or after the effective date of this act or the offender
is serving a sentence of incarceration, probation, parole or other form
of community supervision as a result of the offense or is confined following acquittal by reason of insanity or as a result of civil commitment
on the effective date if this act;
(3) A conviction, adjudication of delinquency or acquittal by reason of
insanity for an offense similar to any offense enumerated in paragraph
(2) or a sentence on the basis of criteria similar to the criteria set forth
in paragraph (1) of this subsection entered or imposed under the laws
of the United States, this state or another state.
Id.
35 Id. § 2C:7-2(a).
36 Id. § 2C:7-2(b) (1).
37 Id. § 2C:7-2(a).
38 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-3 (West 1995). Notice of the obligation to register will be
provided by the sentencing court; by the Department of Corrections, the Administrative Office of the Courts, and the Department of Human Services; by the Division of
Motor Vehicles; and by the Attorney General. Id.
39 Id. § 2C:7-2(c). The registration procedures for sexual offenders require that
persons under supervision such as work release, parole, probation, furlough, or a similar program "shall register at the time the person is placed under supervision or no
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offenders who are required to register can file a petition in superior court to terminate their registration obligation if in the fifteen
years following a conviction or release from prison they have not
committed any offenses or the person does not pose a threat to
public safety.40
Each registrant must provide detailed physical descriptions
and vital statistics, including permanent and temporary addresses
and place of employment.4" Additionally, a complete criminal history must be provided for registration.4 2 The statute allows the Attorney General to specify any other pertinent information required
to assess the risk of reoffense, including nonprivileged records and
genetic markers.43
The registering agent must send the information to both the
state central registry and to the prosecutor of the county in which
the offender intends to reside.' The county prosecutor must in
turn transmit the information to local law enforcement agencies.45
The fingerprints and conviction data are also sent to the Federal
later than 120 days after the effective date of this act, whichever is later" with the
agency responsible for supervision. Id. § 2C:7-2(c)(1).
Persons confined in correctional institutions or those involuntarily committed
"shall register prior to release in accordance with procedures established by the Department of Corrections or the Department of Human Services." Id. § 2C:7-2(c) (2).
A person moving into NewJersey from another state "shall register with the chief
law enforcement officer of the municipality in which the person will reside ... within
120 days of the effective date of this act or 70 days of first residing in or returning to a
municipality in this State, whichever is later." Id. § 2C:7-2(c)(3).
Offenders convicted before the law went into effect who are not in custody or
supervision "shall register within 120 days of the effective date of this act with the
chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which the person will reside." Id.
§ 2C:7-2(c) (4).
If registered persons move, they must notify the law enforcement agency they are
registered with and must reregister 10 days before they intend to reside at the new
address. Id. § 2C:7-2(d). A person who is required to register under this Act for a
conviction or an offense similar to the ones enumerated in the law must verify his
address annually with the proper law enforcement agent. Id. § 2C:7-2(e). For an example of the sex offender registration form, see infra Appendix A.
40 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(f).
41 Id. § 2C:7-4(b) (1). The information that must be gathered for registration includes the offender's "name, ocial security number, age, race, sex, date of birth,
height, weight, hair and eye color, address of legal residence, address of any current
temporary address, date and place of employment." Id.
42 Id. § 2C:7-4(b) (2). A registrant must provide the "[d] ate and place of each conviction, adjudication or acquittal by reason of insanity, indictment number, fingerprints, and a brief description of the crime or crimes for which registration is
required." Id.
43 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-4(b) (3).
44 Id. § 2C:7-4(c).
45 Id.
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The law provides immunity from civil

liability to public officials or employees for their discretionary decisions to release necessary and relevant information to other' employees, agencies, or the general public.47 A recent amendment to
the current law provides that certain sex offenses cannot be expunged from an offender's records.48
B.

Notification

The goal of notification is to increase public safety through
awareness. 49 The law establishes three levels, or tiers, of classification and notification-low (Tier One), moderate (Tier Two), and
high (Tier Three)-based on the risk of reoffense. 50 The classification of the sex offender and the method of notification will be

determined by the county prosecutor.5 1 In determining the risk of
Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-5(b). The civil immunity provision includes exceptions
for gross negligence and bad faith. Id.
48 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:52-2(b), amended by 1994 N.J. LAws c.133 § 6. The amendment provides, in part, that:
Records of conviction for the following crimes specified in the New
Jersey Code of Criminal Justice shall not be subject to expungement:
Section 2C:11-1 et seq. (Criminal Homicide), except death by auto as
specified in section 2C:11-5; section 2C:13-1 (Kidnapping); section
2C:13-6 (Luring or Enticing); section 2C:14-2 (Aggravated Sexual Assault); section 2C:14-3a (Aggravated Criminal Sexual Contact); if the
victim is a minor, section 2C:14-3b (Criminal Sexual Contact); if the
victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent of the victim, section 2C:13-2 (Criminal Restraint) or section 2C:13-3 (False Imprisonment); section 2C:15-1 (Robbery); section 2C:17-1 (Arson and Related
Offenses); section 2C:24-4a. (Endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of
a child); section 2C:24-4b(4) (Endangering the welfare of a child); section 2C:28-1 (Perjury); section 2C:28-2 (False Swearing) and conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.
Id.
49 Brief for amici curiae Maureen & Richard Kanka et aL at 11, Artway v. Attorney
General of New Jersey, 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995) (No. 94-6287(NHP)).
50 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c).
51 Id. § 2C:7-8(d). The tier classification is determined by both the prosecutor of
the county where the offender was convicted and the prosecutor of the county where
the offender intends to live. Id. § 2C:7-8(d) (1). The method of notification is determined by the county prosecutor where the registrant lives. Id. § 2C:7-8(d) (2). If a
registrant relocates, the chief law enforcement officer for the community to which the
offender relocates shall notify the community. Id. § 2C:7-7. All records pertaining to
notification and disclosure shall be kept in accordance with the Attorney General
Guidelines. Id. § 2C:7-8(e).
But see Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 30, 662 A.2d 367, 382 (1995). Although leaving
the initial determination as to tier classification and manner of notification in the
hands of the prosecutor, the Doe decision modifies the procedures by requiring that
sex offenders be given an opportunity for judicial review of the tier classification and
46
47
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reoffense and level of classification, the prosecutor must consider
the criteria set out in the statute.5 2
manner of notification if they so request. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court established an elaborate framework to accommodate any such requests. Id. at 30-35, 662
A.2d at 382-85.
52 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(b). The relevant factors that a prosecutor must
consider include:
(1) Conditions of release that minimize risk of re-offense, including but
not limited to whether the offender is under supervision of probation
or parole; receiving counseling, therapy or treatment; or residing in a
home situation that provides guidance and supervision;
(2) Physical conditions that minimize risk of re-offense, including but
not limited to advanced age or debilitating illness;
(3) Criminal history factors indicative of high risk of re-offense,
including:
(a) Whether the offender's conduct was found to be characterized
by repetitive and compulsive behavior;
(b) Whether the offender served the maximum term;
(c) Whether the offender committed the sex offense against a
child;
(4) Other criminal history factors to be considered in determining risk,
including:
(a) The relationship between the offender and the victim;
(b) Whether the offense involved the use of a weapon, violence, or
infliction of serious bodily injury;
(c) The number, date and nature of prior offenses;
(5) Whether psychological or psychiatric profiles indicate a risk of
recidivism;
(6) The offender's response to treatment;
(7) Recent behavior, including behavior while confined or while under
supervision in the community as well as behavior in the community following service of sentence; and
(8) Recent threats against persons or expressions of intent to commit
additional crimes.
Id.; see also Memorandum from Deputy Attorney GeneralJessica S. Oppenheim, Prosecutors Bureau, State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of
CriminalJustice to all [N.J.] County Prosecutors, GuidelinesforLaw Enforcement for Notification to Local Officials and/or the Community of the Entry of Sex Offender Into the Community 7, 8 (Sept. 14, 1995) [hereinafter Attorney General Guidelines] (referring to
addendum, entitled Sex Offender Risk Assessment Scale Manual (Sept. 14, 1995), which
further defines the factors to be considered for tier classification) (both on file with
the Seton HallLaw Review). For an example of the Sex Offender Risk Assessment Scale
Manual utilized by county prosecutors, see infra Appendix B.
Pursuant to its mandate that offenders be given an opportunity for a judicial
hearing prior to classification, the NewJersey Supreme Court, in Doe v. Poritz, offered
even more specific guidance to courts reviewing a prosecutor's determination as to
tier classification and manner of notification. Doe, 142 N.J. at 32, 662 A.2d at 383.
The court mandated that the reviewing court must affirm the prosecutor's classification determination unless "persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that [the
determination] does not conform to the law and guidelines." Id. The majority pronounced that the only issue before a reviewing court is risk of reoffense. Id. The
court then addressed the standard for distinguishing between Tier Two (moderate
risk) and Tier Three (high risk) based on the factors in the law and the Attorney General Guidelines. Id. at 32-33, 662 A.2d at 383. The majority noted that all offenders
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The extent of notification varies by tier classification.5 3 A Tier
One low-risk classification only requires that community law enforcement personnel be notified.54 Tier Two moderate-risk classifications, in addition to requiring notification to local law
enforcement, require notification to religious, youth, and other
community organizations, and to schools. 55 Tier Three high-risk

classifications require public notification as well as the requirements of Tiers One and Two.3 6 Additionally, the law permits pubrequired to register fit into Tier One notification, regardless of risk of reoffense. Id.
at 33, 662 A.2d at 383. The court provided the following detailed criteria for differentiating between the tier classifications:
We conclude that the legislative intent was to use the word "moderate"
in comparison to the "low" risk that the Legislature found was minimally characteristic of all those sex offenders required to register.
Where Tier Two notification is sought, the State's prima facie case shall
include a description of the class of sex offenders required to register
who constitute low-risk offenders, including a description of that risk,
which need not necessarily be statistical; a further description of that
class of sex offenders required to register who constitute moderate-risk
offenders, including a description of that risk, not necessarily statistical;
some proof, in the form of expert opinion or otherwise, that the moderate-risk offender class poses a risk of reoffense substantially higher than
the low-risk class, and that the offender before the court is a moderate
risk-offender who poses such a substantially higher risk.
Where Tier Three notification is sought, the State's primafacie case
shall include, in addition to the description of low-risk and moderaterisk offenders and the risk associated with each class, a description of
the class of sex offenders required to register who constitute high-risk
offenders, including a description of that risk, not necessarily statistical;
some proof, in the form of expert opinion or otherwise, that the highrisk offender class poses a risk of reoffense substantially higher than the
moderate-risk offender class, and that the offender before the court is a
high-risk offender who poses that substantially higher risk.
Id.
53 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c).
54 Id. § 2C:7-8(c) (1). At a minimum, all sex offenders who are required to register
will be considered Tier One. Doe, 142 NJ. at 33, 662 A.2d at 383.
55 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c) (2). In Doe v. Poritz, the Supreme Court established
mandatory procedures for the manner of Tier Two notification. Doe, 142 N.J. at 35,
662 A.2d at 384-85. The court interpreted the statute to state that only organizations
that have custody or care of children or women and are "likely to encounter" the
offender may receive Tier Two notification. Id., 662 A.2d at 384. The court stated
that the critical factor in determining "likely to encounter" is geographic proximity to
the offender's place of work, residence, or school. Id. at 37, 662 A.2d at 385. The
court, however, acknowledged that the determination must be made on a case-by-case
basis and allowed for consideration of factors other than geography. Id. Additionally,
the court instructed any organization receiving Tier Two notice "not to notify anyone
else." Id. at 35, 662 A.2d at 384. The court asserted that an interpretation excluding
organizations that concern the welfare of women and/or children, but do not actually
have them under custody or care, accords with the Attorney General Guidelines. Id., 662
A.2d at 384-85.
56 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8 (c)
(3). As with Tier Two notification, the New Jersey
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lic notification for situations not specifically enumerated in the
statute when a danger to the community exists.57 All notification
must be conducted pursuant to the Attorney General Guidelines.5 8 A

person will not be held liable for his or her decision to provide or
not to provide information under this Act.5 9
II.
A.

SEX OrMNDERS

A Profile of the Sex Offender

Megan's Law purports to protect society from the habitual sex

61
offender.6" Although the law covers a wide range of sex offenses,
the notification provisions only target a small group of dangerous
offenders whose behavior is characterized by repetitive and compulsive conduct.6 2 Laws specifically targeting sex offenders, as distinct from other criminals, have generally existed since World War

I.6" Historically, sex offenders have been singled out due to a perSupreme Court set forth mandatory procedures to be followed for Tier Three notification. Doe, 142 N.J. at 36, 662 A.2d at 385. For Tier Three notification, the court
stated that "'likely to encounter' clearly includes the immediate neighborhood of the
offender's residence and not just the people next door." Id. The court elaborated
that Tier Three notification could include all schools within a municipality, contingent upon its size, as well as schools or institutions in neighboring municipalities if
within close proximity to the offender. Id.
57 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-10.
58 Id. § 2C:7-8(d) (requiring the Attorney General to promulgate guidelines for
the evaluation of risk of reoffense and implementation of community notification).
Pursuant to the NewJersey Supreme Court's opinion in Doe v. Poritz, the Attorney
General has issued revised guidelines. See Attorney GeneralGuidelines, supranote 52. In
Doe, the court established that the Attorney General Guidelineswere adequate as enacted
as to Tiers One and Two, but needed revisions as to Tier Three. Doe, 142 N.J. at 35,
36, 662 A.2d at 384, 385. In order to comply with the court's mandate, the revised
Attorney General Guidelinesprohibit public notification through a press release or radio
announcement. Attorney General Guidelines, supra note 52, at 12. The Attorney General
Guidelines now require a more particularized method of notification-such as door-todoor announcements or by mail-that will only appraise those members of the public
who are "likely to encounter the offender." Id. at 12-13. The prosecutor's office is
also prohibited from answering any questions from the press relating to a particular
offender. Id. at 12.
59 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-9. Immunity, however, does not apply to "willful or wanton acts of commission or omission." Id.
60 Id. § 2C:7-1.
61 Id. § 2C:7-2(b); see also supra note 34 (providing statutory text defining sexual
offenses relevant to Megan's Law).
62 Id. § 2C:7-8(c). The notification provision provides for a determination of the
risk of reoffense classifying the offender into one of three notification tiers. Id. Public notification is only allowed when the risk of reoffense is high. Id. § 2C:7-8(c) (3).
63 ALFRED B. VUOCOLO, THE REPETITIVE SEX OFFENDER xi (1969). Michigan was the
first state to target the habitual sex offender with the adoption of its sexual psychopathic law in 1937. Id at 25. By 1966, 31 states had developed laws directed specifically toward the habitual sex offender. Id at xi.
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ception that they pose a special danger to the community.64 One
reason for this perception is that sex crimes draw considerable attention, especially when committed against children. 65 The perception that sex offenders pose a special danger to the community
has gained substance from studies showing that sex offenders
ex66
hibit a higher rate of recidivism than previously thought.
Although sex offenders have historically been targeted by legislation that has subjected them to disparate treatment than the
general criminal population, the criminal justice system has been
inconsistent in its categorization and treatment of sex offenders.
64 Id. at 7. This perception arises from two seemingly disparate sources: the concept that sex offenders are both mentally ill and criminally accountable. Id.
Specifically,
[t]he public has been ready to accept the concept that something must
be mentally and/or physically wrong with certain types of offenders.
This applies primarily to the narcotic user, the mother who kills her
child and the sexual offender .... [W]ith the sex offender, perhaps
because of the great amount of resentment generated toward the childmolester, or the homosexual who flaunts a disdainful attitude toward
moral values, or the exhibitionist or rapist who inflicts himself upon
others in an offensive manner, the attitude is somewhat different. Here
society, while recognizing the need for treatment and the presence of
powerful internal drives, remains reluctant to remove accountability
.... It continues to demand chastisement or at least restraint.
Id.
65 See Mendez, Measures Go to Governor, supra note 1, at 1 (reporting that Megan's
Law resulted in part from the high visibility of the underlying crime); see also, Mendez,
supra note 3, at 3 (noting same).
66 See A. Nicholas Groth et al., Undetected Recidivism Among Rapists and Child Molesters, 28 CRIME AND DELINQ., 450, 456 (July 1982) (concluding that contrary to popular
belief, sex offenders "are serious recidivists," exhibiting recidivism rates comparable
to nonsexual offenders); Joseph J. Romero & Linda Meyer Williams, Recidivism Among
Convicted Sex Offenders: A 10-Year Followup Study, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1985, at 63
(noting that individuals with a history of sex offenses tend to demonstrate higher
recidivism rates than one-time offenders).
67 See VUOCOLO, supra note 63, at 8 (asserting that although sex offender laws vary
greatly, each jurisdiction finds the statutory framework unsatisfactory). These unsatisfactory laws arise from a conflicting societal perception of sexual offenses:
At one end of the scale is found the philosophy that these acts represent
mere moral weakness; opposed to this is the notion that they are a result
of a psychologically-determined organism and probably not within the
offender's competence to control. The scientists who plump for psychiatric treatment and relief from legal procedures clash directly here with
those who desire to protect society's values.
What has emerged is legislation in over half of our states that is a
compromise between these moral and scientific considerations. The
laws have not evolved in the natural course of legal progression nor
were they based on research in the area of criminal statistics or treatment of sex offenders. Rather, they were usually hastily prepared in
response to public insistence after a series of local sex crimes.
Id. at 8 (footnote omitted)
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Psychiatrists and corrections professionals have not reached a consensus as to whether sex offenders suffer from mental illnesses requiring treatment, or whether they are criminals who should be
incarcerated and punished. 68 The result is that sex offenders occupy a grey area as both criminals and mentally ill persons.6 9
The confusion regarding the classification and treatment of
sex offenders results from the difficult, if not impossible, task of
attempting to develop an accurate sex offender composite.7 0 Studies have attempted to create a profile of the sex offender by analyzing personality traits; these studies, however, have been
inconclusive. 71 For example, a recent study categorized sex offenders by the nature of the crime and by the age of the victim. 7 2 This
study found that pedophiles are predominately white males, y3 of all
age categories, y4 with prior histories tending to show few crimes
against property, 75 and exhibiting a lifestyle centered around deviant sexual behavior. 76 The rapists, the study concluded, tended to
be younger than both pedophiles and hebephiles 7
The racial characteristics of rapists were inversely related to
the age of the victim; as the age of the victim increased beyond
sixteen years of age, the offender was more likely to be non-Cauca68 Id. at 16-18. For an overview of the perspective that sex offenders suffer from a
mental disorder, see Fred S. Berlin, The Paraphiliasand Depo-Provera: Some Medica,
Ethical and Legal Considerations, 17 BuLL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 233, 233-34
(1989) (averring that pedophilia is a mental disorder that can be treated and that
making a moral statement about pedophiliacs by placing them in prison does not
help because prison alone will not increase the pedophile's ability to deal with the
problem).
69 See VUOCOLO, supra note 63, at 17-18.
70 Id. at 57. Dr. Vuocolo states that "[ifn addition to the many problems of definition, there exists the major consideration of extent and method of sampling." Id.
71 See, e.g., Bruce Duthie & Daniel L. Mclvor, A New System for Cluster-CodingChild
Molester MMPI Profile Types, 17 CRim.Jus-r. & BEHAV. 199, 199-200 (1990) (noting that
grouping child molesters with other sexual offenders has made it more difficult to
identify the differences between classes of child molesters and other offenders);James
M. Peters & William D. Murphy, Profiling Child Sexual Abusers: Legal Considerations, 19
Cram. JUST. & BEtAv. 38, 39 (1992) (reporting that psychological profiles are rarely
used as evidence in court because they are considered unreliable); Andrei Kuznestov
et al., Victim Age as a Basisfor ProfilingSex Offenders, FED. PROBATION, June 1992, at 34
(finding that empirical evidence shows that reliance on personality traits in clinical
studies is ambiguous).
72 See Kuzenstov, supra note 71, at 35.
73 Id. at 36. The study found that 83% of offenders who victimize children under
age 10 are white males. Id.
74 Id. at 35.
75 Id. at 36.
76 Id. at 37.
77 Id. at 35, 36. The study found that the majority of rapists were under 30. Id. at
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sian. 7 Unlike pedophiles, rapists tended to have more prior convictions for crimes against property as well as other nonsexual
violent crimes, and their victims were most likely to be strangers or
merely casual acquaintances. 79 According to the study, rapists are
best categorized as "criminal" and "violent."8 ° Marital status was
inconclusive as to either rapists or pedophiles8 1 The third group,
hebephiles, 82 could be described as "family men"; they are more
likely than either rapists or pedophiles to be married, to have children of their own, and to be over age thirty.83
Although it appears that most sexual offenders exhibit some
form of paraphilia,84 dissent reigns within the mental health profession as to whether sexual offenders are mentally ill.85
Paraphiliacs do not consider themselves mentally ill and usually require the aid of mental health professionals after acting out their
urges with nonconsenting partners (thus committing crimes) or
78

Id. at 36.

79 Id.

80 Id.
81 Id. at 35.
82 See D.J. Baxter et al., Deviant Sexual Behavior: DifferentiatingSex Offenders by Criminal and Personal Histoy, Psychometric Measures, and Sexual Response, 11 CRIm. JUST. &
BEHAV., 477, 478 (1984) (defining hebephiles as "men who have sexually molested
pubescent or young postpubescent adolescents").
83 Id. at 486, 488. But see Kuznestov, supra note 71, at 35 (stating that "the heterosexual hebephilic aggressor may be even more psychopathic than aggressors against
adult women or female children").
84 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 279 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM III] (noting that
"[p] araphiliacs are characterized by arousal in response to sexual objects or situations
that are not part of normative arousal-activity patterns"). Paraphilia is a clinicallydefined sexual disorder,
[t]he essential feature of [which] is recurrent intense sexual urges and
sexually arousing fantasies generally involving either (1) nonhuman objects, .(2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's partner (not
merely simulated), or (3) children or other nonconsenting persons.
The diagnosis is made only if the person has acted on these urges, or is
markedly distressed by them.
Id. There are approximately eight recognized paraphilias: (1) exhibitionism; (2)
frotteurism; (3) fetishism; (4) pedophilia; (5) transvestic fetishism; (6) sexual sadism;
(7) sexual masochism; and (8) voyeurism. Id. at 280.
85 See, e.g., James D. Reardon, Sexual Predators: Mental Illness or Abnormality? A Psychiatrist'sPerspective, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 849, 849 (1992) (attacking the soundness of the Washington State Legislature's adoption of "sexually violent predator" as a
form of mental illness). Dr. Reardon argues that there is no such classification in the
scientific literature; he asserts that the legislature is confusing "mental disorder"
(characterized by "the loss of contact with reality, confusion, loss of reason, or hallucinations") with "abnormal behavior." Id. at 852. But see Berlin, supranote 68, at 234-35
(proposing that paraphilia is a mental disorder, comparable to drug addiction or alcoholism, that may be treatable with Depo-Provera). Id.
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when their behavior leads to conflict with their sexual partners.8 6
Many paraphiliacs suffer from more than one paraphilia and may
also have other mental disorders.8 7
B.

Treatment and Recidivism

Mental health officials disagree about the effectiveness of
treatment for sex offenders.8 8 Studies conclude that recidivism
among sex offenders is very high, regardless of whether they have
attended treatment.8 9 Other studies, however, conclude that sex
offenders can be rehabilitated and that their recidivism rate is no
higher than that of other criminals. 90
The Legislature based the notification provisions of Megan's
Law on the premise that habitual or compulsive sex offenders have
a higher rate of recidivism and that some suffer from a mental illness, 9 1 consequently rendering them dangerous.9 2 Although the
DSM III, supra note 84, at 280.
Id. The DSM III states that "[p]ersonality disturbances, particularly emotional
immaturity, are also frequent, and may be severe enough to warrant an Axis II diagnosis of a Personality Disorder." Id. at 281.
88 See Seth C. Kalichman, Commentary on Alexander (1993), 20 CRIM.JUST. & BEHAV.
388, 389 (1993) (noting that arguments between hospitalization and incarceration of
sex offenders suffer from a lack of proven effective treatment techniques). But see
Robert J. McGrath, Sex-Offender Risk Assessment and Disposition Planning: A Review of
Empirical and Clinical Findings, 35 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY
328, 329 (1991) (concluding that advances in treatment and assessment of sex offenders have made treatment a useful mechanism in reducing recidivism).
89 See Vernon L. Quinsey et al., Assessing Treatment Efficacy In Outcome Studies of Sex
86
87

Offenders, 8J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 512, 521 (1993) (concluding that effectiveness
of treatment in reducing sex offender recidivism has not yet been demonstrated); see
also, Lita Furby et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BuLL.3, 25 & n.9
(1989) (noting that the recidivism rate of treated offenders tends to be higher than
the rate of untreated offenders); Margit C. Henderson & Seth C. Kalichman, Sexually
Deviant Behavior and Schizotypy: A Theoretical Perspective with Supportive Data, 61 PsYCHIATRIC Q. 273, 273 (1990) (recognizing that most treatment approaches result in high
recidivism rates).
90 Robert J. McGrath, Sex Offender Treatment: Does It Work ? PERSPECTIVES, Winter
1995, at 24; see also, McGrath, supra note 88, at 328 (noting that recent studies have
yielded encouraging results in the efficacy of sex offender treatment).
91 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2(r) (West Supp. 1995). The law defining mental illness states:
"Mental illness" means a current, substantial disturbance of thought,
mood, perception or orientation which significantly impairs judgment,
capacity to control behavior or capacity to recognize reality, but does
not include simple alcohol intoxication, transitory reaction to drug ingestion, organic brain syndrome or developmental disability unless it
results in the severity of impairment described herein. The term mental
illness is not limited to "psychosis" or "active psychosis," but shall include all conditions that result in severity of impairment described
herein.
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Legislature may reasonably accept this view, the question remains
whether the state will be able, based on the current perspective of
psychiatric knowledge, to accurately identify those offenders who
pose the highest risk of recidivism for Tier Three notification.9"
III.

CONSTITuTIONAL ISSUES RAISED AGAINST THE REGISTRATION
AND NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS

Megan's Law applies to all sex offenders who have been found
to be habitual and compulsive, regardless of the time of the conviction or adjudication.94 Sex offenders who have served their time
and have returned to the community are required to register95
and, in some cases, will be subject to community notification, regardless of when the offense was committed.96 Offenders who were
convicted or adjudicated for a sex offense prior to the enactment
of Megan's Law claim that the law as applied to them violates the
constitutional prohibition9 7 against ex post facto laws,98 bills of atId.
92 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (a) (West 1995) (providing legislative purpose for
Megan's Law, specifying sex offenders as "persons who prey on others as a result of
mental illness").
93 Cf Doe v. Poritz, 142 NJ. 1, 15, 662 A.2d 367, 374 (1995) (noting that the
legislative determination that recidivism of sex offenders poses a serious public threat
is beyond judicial review and accepting legislative reliance on supporting scientific
data).
94 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(b)(1). If a sex offender is characterized as repetitive
and compulsive, Megan's Law applies even if that person was convicted or adjudicated
prior to its enactment. Id.
95 Id. § 2C:7-2(c) (4).
96 Id. § 2C:7-5(a) (stating that "[1]aw enforcement agencies in this State shall be
authorized to release relevant and necessary information regarding sex offenders to
the public when the release of the information is necessary for public protection"); see
also supra notes 51-52, 54-56, 58 (discussing the notification procedure as modified by
the New Jersey Supreme Court).
97 See Carter, supra note 2, at 1, 10.
98 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting Congress from passing ex post facto
laws); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting individual state governments from
passing ex postfacto laws). The New Jersey Constitution of 1947 contains a similar prohibition. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, 1 3. The New Jersey Constitution's prohibition
against ex post facto laws has been found to be coextensive with the United States Constitution's prohibition. See, e.g., In re Recycling & Salvage Corp., 246 N.J. Super. 79,
106, 586 A.2d 1300, 1315 (App. Div. 1991).
In defining the boundaries of the ex post facto clause, the United States Supreme
Court has stated that " [ a ] lthough the Latin phrase 'ex post facto' literally encompasses
any law passed 'after the fact,' it has long been recognized by this Court that the
constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which
disadvantage the offender affected by them." Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41
(1990) (citations omitted). For further discussion of what constitutes an ex post facto
law, see infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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tainder, 9 double jeopardy,'
and cruel and unusual punishment. 1 ' Additional challenges are based on claims that the law
violates the sex offender's right to privacy, procedural due process,
and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
102
Constitution.
In its recent opinion, Doe v. Poritz, the New Jersey Supreme
Court addressed all of these constitutional issues, resolving each
primarily on the basis of federal law.'
In Doe, the court rebuffed
the constitutional attacks to the registration and notification provisions of the statute.'0 4 In upholding Megan's Law, the court deferred to the Legislature, acknowledging the difficult choice
between potential unfairness to previously convicted sex offenders
who may have reintegrated into the community and to innocent
women and children who, without the information that notification provides, might not be able to adequately protect
themselves. 0 5
The court found that, having chosen to balance the risk of
unfairness in favor of protecting potential victims, the Legislature
attempted to narrowly tailor the reach of notification to limit its
impact on sex offenders. 10 6 Furthermore, the court determined
that the Legislature could reasonably adopt the view that sex offenders have a higher rate of recidivism than other criminal of99 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A bill of attainder is defined as "[I] egislative acts,
no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a
judicial trial." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (6th ed. 1990).
100 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Double jeopardy is generally defined as a "Fifth Amendment guarantee, enforceable against [the] states through [the] Fourteenth Amendment, [which] protects against second prosecution for [the] same offense after
acquittal or conviction, and against multiple punishment for [the] same offense."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 491 (6th ed. 1990).
101 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment has been characterized by the United States Supreme Court as proscribing torture and other barbaric forms of punishment. Estelle v. Gambel, 429 U.S. 97, 102
(1976). The Court has also established that wha, is considered cruel and unusual
punishment depends on "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society." Id.
102 See Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 26, 662 A.2d 367, 380 (1995); see also Artway v.
Attorney General of New Jersey, 876 F. Supp. 666, 668 (D.NJ. 1995).
103 Doe, 142 N.J. at 42, 662 A.2d at 388. The majority stated that its holding relied
almost completely on federal cases, despite the plaintiff's challenge basis on both the
NewJersey and Federal Constitutions. Id. The court explained that "[w]e know of no
relevant New Jersey cases on any of these issues." Id.
104 Id. at 110, 662 A.2d at 423. The court modified and affirmed the trial court's
judgment and rejected the constitutional attack on the law. Id.
105 Id. at 13, 15, 662 A.2d at 373, 374.
106 Id. at 13, 662 A.2d at 373.
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fenders. 10 7 The court also acknowledged that unless the law were
made to apply retroactively, it would not protect anyone until some
time in the distant future.10 8 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
court upheld Megan's Law based on an interpretation of the statute that "strictly confine [s] ... notification in accordance with legislative intent""0 9 and requires judicial review of both tier
classification and the specific manner of notification before actual
notification when requested by the offender."'
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Stein disputed the majority's resolution of the constitutional issues."1 The justice found that the
retroactive application of Megan's Law renders it unconstitutional
despite the legislative intent.1 1 2 Additionally, the dissent disagreed
with the majority's standard for determining whether the notification provision constitutes punishment, stating that the court
11 3
placed a mistaken emphasis on legislative intent.
A.

Is the Law Punitive? The Ex Post Facto Punishment, Bill of
Attainder, Double Jeopardy, and Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Challenges

Central to the challenges to Megan's Law lies the claim that
registration and notification constitute punishment, 1 4 making
those who were convicted or adjudicated prior to the enactment of
the law subject to punishment greater than that stipulated by law at
the time of the crime. 5 Historically, the prohibition against ex
post facto laws arose from the colonists' experience with the abuse
of such devices by the British." 6 In Calderv. Bull, the United States
107 Id. at 15, 662 A.2d at 374. The court stated that although there are different
views on the subject of sex offender recidivism, it is within the Legislature's power to
determine which view it will accept and "[s]uch a legislative determination is beyond
judicial review." Id.
108 Id. at 13-14, 662 A.2d at 373.
109 Id. at 28, 29, 662 A.2d at 381. For a more detailed discussion of how the court's
interpretation affects notification, see supra notes 51-52, 54-56, 58.
110 Doe, 142 NJ. at 30, 662 A.2d at 382.
111 Id. at 111, 113-14, 662 A.2d at 423, 424 (Stein, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 113, 662 A.2d at 424 (Stein, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 145, 662 A.2d at 440 (Stein, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 44, 46, 662 A.2d at 389, 390; see also Artway v. Attorney General of New
Jersey, 876 F. Supp. 666, 668 (D.NJ. 1995).
115 Id. at 44, 662 A.2d at 389; see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)
(defining ex post facto laws).
116 See Calder, 3 U.S. at 389. In Calder, Justice Chase catalogued the British abuses
giving rise to the U.S. prohibition:
The prohibition against their making any ex post facto laws was introduced for greatercaution, and very probably arose from the knowledge,
that the Parliamentof Great Britainclaimed and exercised a power to pass
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Supreme Court established that only those laws that inflict criminal
117
sanctions violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Whether Megan's Law violates the prohibition against ex post
facto laws turns on a determination of the law's punitive effect.1 18
Similarly, a conclusion as to whether the law is punitive is also relevant to the discussion of whether Megan's Law violates the Double
Jeopardy Clause,1 19 the prohibition against bills of attainder, 120 and
such laws, under the denomination of bills of attainder,or bills of pains and
penalties, the first inflicting capita4 and the other less, punishment. These
acts were legislativejudgments; and an exercise ofjudicial power. Sometimes
they respected the crime, by declaring acts to be treason, which were not
treason, when committed; at other times, they violated the rules of evidence (to supply a deficiency of legal proof) by admitting one witness,
when existinglaw required two; by receiving evidence without oath; or the
oath of the wife against the husband; or other testimony, which the
courts of justice would not admit; at other times they inflicted punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment,and in
other cases, they inflicted greater punishment, than the law annexed to
the offence. The ground for the exercise of such legislative power was
this, that the safety of the kingdom depended on the death, or other
punishment, of the offender .... To prevent such, and similar acts of
violence and injustice, I believe, the Federal and State Legislatures, were
prohibited from passing any bill of attainde7, or any ex post facto law.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
117 Id. at 390. Calder defined the boundaries of the ex post facto clause as:
[First, e]very law that makes an action done before the passing of the
law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such
action. [Second, e]very law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater
than it was, when committed. [Third, e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greaterpunishment,than the law annexed to the crime,
when committed. [Fourth, e]very law that alters the legal rules of evidence... in order to convict the offender.
Id.
In later cases, however, the United States Supreme Court moved away from the
notion that criminal punishment was the determinative factor in ex post facto analysis.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 352 (1898) (expanding the Calderdefinition
to include laws that deprive a person of "asubstantial right involv[ing] [their] liberty"); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 235 (1882) (altering the Calderdefinition of an
ex post facto law to one that, in relation to an offense, changes the situation of a person
to his disadvantage). Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court returned
to the Calderstandard, reestablishing punishment as the determinative factor in an ex
post facto analysis. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 47-52 (1990) (stating that
the departure from Calder v. Bull taken by the Kring decision was unjustified).
118 Cf Collins, 497 U.S. at 47-52 (reestablishing punishment as the determinative
factor in an ex post facto analysis).
119 Cf United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 443 (1989) (determining that in a
double jeopardy context, the Court's inquiry must ask "whether a civil sanction, in
application, may be so divorced from any remedial goal that it constitutes
'punishment"').
In Halper, the Supreme Court analyzed whether a civil penalty could be considered punishment in the context of double jeopardy. Id. at 436. The Court rejected
the Government's argument that because the statute in question was merely civil in

1996]

MEGAN'S LAW

783

cruel and unusual punishment.1 2 1 Generally, the registration comnature, the Court was limited to an analysis of statutory construction to determine the
law's punitive nature. Id. at 441. The Court explained:
our cases have acknowledged that for the defendant even remedial
sanctions carry the sting of punishment.... [Wle hold merely that in
determining whether a particular civil sanction constitutes criminal
punishment, it is the purposes actually served by the sanction in question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise to the
sanction, that must be evaluated.
Id. at 447 n.7.
120 Cf.Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977) (explaining
that the Bill of Attainder Clause forbids legislative punishment only if the government
action inflicts punishment, rather than merely imposing "burdensome
consequences").
The history of the bill of attainder was recounted by the Court in United States v.
Brown. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-46 (1965). The bill of attainder was
a device used in England between the 16th and 18th centuries. Id. at 441. The bill of
attainder consisted of a parliamentary act sentencing to death specific persons, usually for treason. Id. The attainder normally tainted the person's family-known as
"corruption of blood"-so that the attaindant's heirs were prohibited from inheriting
property. Id. Parliament also employed what was known as a "bill of pains and penalties," a device similar to the bill of attainder except that it carried penalties short of
death. Id. Generally, the parties to be punished were named in the bills of attainder
or bills of pains and penalties; sometimes, however, the parties were just described.
Id. at 442.
In adopting the prohibition against bills of attainder, the drafters of the Constitution also included a prohibition against bills of pain and suffering. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866). By including the prohibition against bills of
attainder, the Framers intended to restrict both the federal and state legislatures in
order to protect the people of the United States from "the violent acts which might
grow out of the feelings of the moment." Id. at 322.
The Cummings Court stated further that "[i]n these cases [of bills of pains and
penalties] the legislative body, in addition to its legitimate functions, exercises the
powers and office ofjudge... it pronounces upon the guilt of the party, without any
of the forms or safe guards of trial." Id. at 323. The Court continued, noting. that
"[i]n all these cases there would be the legislative enactment creating the deprivation
without any of the ordinary forms and guards provided for the security of the citizen
in the administration of justice by the established tribunals." Id. at 325.
As with ex post facto challenges to a law, a challenger claiming that a law violates
the prohibition against bills of attainder must establish that the legislation constitutes
punishment. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475-478. In Nixon, the Supreme Court established
a three-part test for determining whether legislation imposes punishment. Id. at 47276, 478. First, the Court applied the "historical experience" test, examining whether
the legislation imposed a "depravation or disability" that has traditionally been prohibited under the bill of attainder clause. Id. at 472-73. Second, the Court employed
a "functional test" analyzing the law in terms of the severity and type of burdens imposed, and whether such burdens further nonpunitive legislative purposes. Id. at 47576.
Finally, the Court utilized a "motivational test" that inquires whether the legislative record indicates an intent to punish. Id. at 478. In holding that Megan's Law did
not violate the prohibition against bills of attainder, the federal district court in
Artway applied the second prong of the Nixon test. Artway v. Attorney General of New
Jersey, 876 F. Supp. 666, 684 (D.N.J. 1995).
121 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99, 102-03 (1958) (holding that a statute revok-
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ponents of sex offender registration122laws, such as Megan's Law,
have been found to be nonpunitive.
In resolving the issue of what constitutes punishment, the
United States Supreme Court normally has not distinguished between the ex postfacto, double jeopardy, bills of attainder, and cruel
and unusual punishment contexts.1 23 The Supreme Court has,
for determining whether a law is puhowever, developed standards
124
nitive in two lines of cases.
125
In the first line-characterized by United States v. Ward, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,126 DeVeau v. Braistead,127 and Trop v. Duling citizenship upon military conviction for desertion is penal in nature and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment). The Trop Court noted that in certain contexts,
including both ex post facto and cruel and unusual punishment cases, the court must
determine whether punishment has been imposed at all. Id. at 94-96. In Trop, the
Court relied in part on its analysis concerning the ex post facto challenge to ascertain
whether punishment had been assessed. Id. at 95-96.
122 See Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 43-44, 662 A.2d 367, 388-89 (1995) (holding that
the registration and notification provisions of Megan's Law are remedial, rather than
punitive); Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 688, 692 (holding that registration provision of
Megan's Law is not punitive and does not violate prohibition against ex postfacto laws,
but that the community notification provision is punitive and unconstitutional); Rowe
v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1380, 1385 (D. Alaska 1994) (determining in a proceeding for a preliminary injunction that sex offender registration act likely to be considered nonpunitive); State v. Nobel, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992) (upholding
registration and limited community notification as regulatory in nature); People v.
Mills, 146 Cal. Rptr. 411, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (deferring to legislative determination of punishment and upholding registration of felony sex offender against cruel
and unusual punishment challenge); People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ill. 1991)
(upholding registration of habitual sex offender against cruel and unusual punishment challenge because registration is not punishment); State v. Costello, 643 A.2d
531, 533-34 (N.H. 1994) (finding that punitive effect of sex offender registration statute is minimal and dismissing ex post facto challenge); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062,
1074 (Wash. 1994) (stating that registration and community notification statute is not
punishment and upholding statute against ex post facto challenge).
But see In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 222 (Cal. 1983) (holding a California statute
requiring sex offenders to register as cruel and unusual punishment under the California Constitution); State v. Babin, 637 So. 2d 814, 824 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (invalidating registration requirements of parole for sex offender as ex post facto
punishment); State v. Payne, 633 So. 2d 701, 703 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
retroactive application of statute requiring registration of sex offenders violated ex post
facto clause because failure to register was punishable by fines, imprisonment, or
both).
123 See supra notes 116-121 (analyzing the historical and legal background of each of
these contexts).
124 CGmpareUnited States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960); and Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958) with Montana Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937
(1994); Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); and United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435 (1989).
125 448 U.S. 244 (1980).
126 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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issue before the Court in each case was

whether a particular statutory penalty was civil or criminal.129 In
these cases, the Court determined the character of the statute
based on its purpose.13 0 In determining whether a law was criminal, the primary inquiry focused on the legislative intent. 131 If the
Legislature's intent was to punish, the inquiry ended and the law
would be considered punitive, rather than regulatory.13 2 Conversely, if the intent was regulatory, the focus turned to whether
33
the "purpose or effect" of the law was punitive.1
In determining whether a law is punitive in its "purpose or
effect," the United States Supreme Court has looked to a number
factors which the Court enumerated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. 1 4 The list of factors enumerated in Mendoza-Martinez has been
363 U.S. 144 (1960).
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
See, e.g., Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-249; Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 164; DeVeau,
363 U.S. at 160; Trop, 356 U.S. at 94, 96.
130 See, e.g., Ward, 448 U.S. at 248; Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169; DeVeau, 363
U.S. at 158; Trop, 356 U.S. at 96.
131 See, e.g., Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 (stating that the nature of a statutory penalty
depends on congressional intent); Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169 (focusing on
congressional intent in determining the punitive nature of a statute); DeVeau, 363 U.S.
at 158 (noting that the primary question involves a determination of legislative aim);
Trop, 356 U.S. at 96 (stating that "[t]he controlling nature of such statutes normally
depends on the evident purpose of the legislature"); see also United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (declaring in the context of due process that "[t]o determine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, we first look to legislative intent").
132 See, e.g., Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 167, 169 (holding that several factors, including congressional intent, require that statute in question be interpreted as punitive); DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 160 (finding that the New York Legislature intended statute
to regulate waterfront crime, not to punish previously convicted felons); Trop, 356'
U.S. at 97 (determining that the purpose of challenged statute is punishment; thus,
the law is penal); see also State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Ariz. 1992) (noting that
"[i]f the legislative aim was punitive, we treat the registration requirement as a
punishment").
133 See, e.g., Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 (stating that in the face of ambiguous congressional intent, Congress's classification of a statutory penalty as civil must stand).
134 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. The Court described the factors to be considered as follows:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment[, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may
often point in differing directions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
127
128
129
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in recent cases to determine
applied as a "test" by several courts
1 5
whether a statute is punitive. 3
In a second and more recent line of cases-represented by
Montana Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,1 3 6 Austin v. United
States,13 7 and United States v. Halper'3 8 (the "Halper line")-the
Court focused not on whether the civil penalty in question was civil
or criminal, but on whether the penalty constituted punishment." 9
In Halper,the Court established that the actual purpose of the sanction, rather than the nature of the proceeding,1 4 is dispositive in
determining whether the sanction constitutes punishment. 4 1 In
the Halper line, the Court seems to focus exclusively on whether
aims of statutory sanctions, namely retthe sanction serves the dual
1 42
ribution and deterrence.

In Doe v. Poritz, the NewJersey Supreme Court approached the
issue of whether Megan's Law is punitive by first setting forth the
traditional analysis of the Trop line and then reconciling with the
135 See, e.g., Artway v. Attorney General of NewJersey, 876 F. Supp. 666, 673 (D.N.J.
1995) (applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors to Megan's Law); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F.
Supp. 1372, 1378-81 (D.Alaska 1994) (applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors to
Alaska's sex offender registration statute); Noble, 829 P.2d at 1221-24 (applying the
Mendoza-Martinez factors to Arizona's sex offender registration statute).
136 114 S.Ct. 1937 (1994).
137 113 S.Ct. 2801 (1993).
138 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
139 See, e.g., Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. at 1946-48 (analyzing whether state's Dangerous
Drug Tax statute constituted punishment); Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2806 (stating that the
central inquiry in analyzing a forfeiture statute is not whether the statute is criminal
or civil, but whether it is punishment); Halper, 490 U.S. at 436, 443 (considering
whether a civil penalty constitutes punishment).
140 Halper,490 U.S. at 447 n.7.
141 Id. at 448. The Court states:
Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment
when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of
punishment.
These goals are familiar. We have recognized in other contexts
that punishment serves the twin aims of retribution and deterrence....
Furthermore, "[r]etribution and deterrence are not legitimate
nonpunitive governmental objectives." . .. From these premises, it follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to
understand the term.
Id. (citations omitted).
142 See, e.g., Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948 (asserting that state drug tax is not
remedial, but purely retributive-and, thus, constitutes punishment); Austin, 113 S.Ct.
at 2806 (noting the distinction between remedial and retributive laws); Halper, 490
U.S. at 448 (concluding that a civil sanction that is retributive, rather than remedial, is
punishment).
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Halperline. 4 ' The Doe court articulated a four-part test for determining whether a law is punitive. 1 " The first step, the court instructed, is to ascertain whether the legislative intent is punitive or
regulatory.1 45 Second, the court determined that if the intent is
clearly punitive, then the inquiry must end. 46 Third, the majority
proclaimed that if the intent is regulatory, then the court must assess whether the impact of the law is punitive, that is, whether the
law advances retribution and deterrence.1 47 Finally, the court declared that a punitive impact-either retribution or deterrenceresults in the law being classified as punishment only if punitive
intent is the sole explanation for such impact. 14 The court further
clarified the distinction between laws that will be considered regulatory and those that will be considered punitive.149
The Doe court continued its analysis by rejecting the interpretation of the Halper line offered by the challengers to Megan's
Law. 5 The court, relying on the factual context of Halper, narrowly interpreted the Halperline.1 51 The majority in Doe identified
specific language in Halper-stating that civil sanctions that do not
serve a solely remedial purpose, but also a deterrent or retributive
purpose, are punitive-as the cause of the confusion surrounding
the question of what constitutes punishment. 152 The Doe court explained that this language was not intended to apply to remedial
sanctions exhibiting some retributive or deterrent effects, but only
to sanctions that may be characterized only as retribution or deterDoe v. Poritz, 142 NJ. 1, 46-73, 662 A.2d 367, 390-404 (1995).
Id. at 46, 662 A.2d at 390.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. The court explained that a law may be characterized as regulatory even if it
has some punitive impact, provided that the impact is "simply an inevitable consequence of the regulatory provisions themselves." Id. The court cautioned, however,
that if the punitive impact of a law is due to unnecessary or excessive aspects in relation to the law's regulatory purpose, then that law will be considered punitive. Id.
150 Id. at 50, 662 A.2d at 392. The challengers and amici had argued that the Halper
line meant that "any punitive impact, no matter how minimal, no matter how clearly
the product of a provision otherwise solely remedial, standing alone, compels the conclusion that punishment has been inflicted for ex post facto purposes." Id. The court
acknowledged that such an interpretation could arguably be supported by the language of the Halperline, but the court concluded that on closer inspection those cases
"say[ ] nothing of the kind." Id.
151 Id. at 52, 662 A.2d at 393. The Doe court noted that Halper involved the issue of
whether a statutory penalty under the False Claim Act would be considered remedial
or punitive. Id.
152 Id. at 50-52, 622 A.2d at 392-93.
145
144
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rence.15 3 Further, the court declared that both Austin and Kurth
5 4
supported this interpretation of Halper.'
The court thus concluded that the Halper line does not stand for the proposition that
any punitive impact, no matter how minimal, will render a civil
155
sanction punitive.
The Doe majority then addressed and rejected the use of the
Mendoza-Martinez test' 5 6 as the determinative test in punishment
analysis. 15 7 The court found that Mendoza-Martinez only provided a
list of factors to be considered, not a dispositive test. 15 8 Finally, the
Doe court held that Megan's Law did not impose punishment.' 59
The majority found that the legislative history and the statutory
purposes articulated in the statute clearly established a remedial
purpose for Megan's Law.' 6 ' Further, the court characterized the
provisions as carefully tailored to perform their remedial function
Id. at 52, 662 A.2d at 393.
Id. at 54, 60, 662 A.2d at 394, 397 (citing Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801,
2806 (1993) and Montana Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945
n.14, 1947 (1994)).
155 Id. at 60, 662 A.2d at 397.
156 See supra notes 134-35 (describing the Mendoza-Martinez factors).
157 Doe, 142 NJ. at 63, 662 A.2d at 398. The court explained the rejection of the
"so-called 'test' of Mendoza-Martinez" by enunciating that:
What seemed clear from the [Mendoza-Martinez] Court's language was
that it was not suggesting any "test" to determine whether a proceeding
is civil or criminal. The Court described the factors as"the tests traditionally applied to determine whether an Act of Congress is penal or
regulatory in character." ... Rather than delineating the list of factors
that must be considered together in order to reach that determination,
the Court simply listed various factors, the tests, each of which had been
used by itself in reaching a determination of whether a statute was penal
(criminal) or regulatory (civil), and each of which therefore might be
relevant in the future in making that determination, whether alone or
in conjunction with the others.
Id. at 64, 662 A.2d at 399 (citation omitted).
In making this determination, the court discussed several United States Supreme
Court cases subsequent to Mendoza-Martinez that did not apply the Mendoza-Martinez
factors as a determinative test. Id. at 65-73, 662 A.2d at 399-404 (citing Austin v.
United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2806 n.6 (1993); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,
447 n.7 (1989); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984); United States v. Ward, 448
U.S. 242, 250-51 (1980); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-39 (1979)).
The Doe court's approach directly conflicts with the method utilized by the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in Artway v. Attorney General
of New Jersey, which relied on the Mendoza-Martinez factors in holding that notification
constituted punishment. Cf Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 876 F. Supp.
666, 673 n.8 (D.N.J. 1995). In Artway, Judge Politan adopted Mendoza-Martinez as the
appropriate analysis in ex post facto review contexts, although both parties contended
in their briefs that the Mendoza-Martinea analysis was not the appropriate test. Id.
158 Doe, 142 N.J. at 64, 662 A.2d at 399.
159 Id. at 73, 662 A.2d at 404.
160 Id.
153
154
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excessive intrusion into the offender's anonymity.1 6
and retributive impacts, the court stated, are simply
unavoidable consequences of the Megan's Law proremedial purpose is to protect the community. 6

The Right to Privacy and the Registration and Notification
Provisions of Megan's Law

Embedded in the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment is the right to privacy.16 3 The right to privacy protects
an individual's interest in keeping personal matters confidential"6
and in autonomously making important personal decisions.1 6 5 The
threshold inquiry in a privacy analysis typically involves a determination of whether the individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.1 6 6 The right to privacy, however, is not absolute, and governmental intrusion into an individual's privacy interest, such as
the gathering and disclosing of certain information, may be justiId. at 74, 662 A.2d at 404.
Id. at 73-74, 662 A.2d at 404.
See United States Dep't ofJustice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 770 (1989)
(acknowledging the constitutionally protected privacy interest in keeping personal
facts from public view); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977)
(stating that "the court has recognized that one aspect of the 'liberty' interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 'a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy'") (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977)
(recognizing privacy interest in certain personal information); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (declaring that "also fundamental is the right to be free, except
in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's
161
162
163

privacy").

164 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 (recognizing that the right of privacy includes "the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters"); see also Reporters
Comm., 489 U.S. at 769 (remarking that "[w]e have also recognized the privacy interest in keeping personal facts away from the public eye"); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (holding that public officials have a recognized interest in avoiding disclosure of "matters of personal life unrelated to any acts done by
them in their public capacity").
165 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment right
to privacy includes a woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (declaring that "[i]f the right to privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual ...to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that
individuals' decisions relating to marriage protected from unwarranted government
intrusion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (invalidating as unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (stating that liberty interest applies to child rearing);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that liberty interest includes
freedom to pursue education).
166 Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990).
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fied. 6 7 The determination of whether the governmental intrusion

is warranted entails balancing the government's interest in disclosure168against the individual's interest in maintaining confidentiality.

Additionally,

some

courts

have

required

that

the

governmental
intrusion be narrowly tailored to advance the state's
69
interest.1
Sex offenders challenging Megan's Law claim that the information gathered at registration and disseminated to the public, at
least at Tiers Two or Three, violates the offenders' right to privacy. 7 ° The information required for registration includes the offender's name, Social Security number, race, age, gender, height,
weight, date of birth, eye and hair color, residential address (legal
and temporary), place and date of employment, 17' and the offender's criminal history. 172 The information that may be released
upon Tier Two or Three classification includes the offender's
name, photograph, address, place of employment or school at167 See, Carey 431 U.S. at 686 (recognizing that the privacy right is not absolute and
that compelling state interests may warrant governmental regulation); see also Nilson
v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that personal information
may be disclosed in the face of a "compelling state interest"); Fraternal Order of the
Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that no
absolute protection against disclosure exists at law).
168 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458. In Nixon, the Court applied a balancing test to a
claimed violation of a confidentiality interest, stating that "the merit of appellant's
claim . . . must be considered in light of the specific provisions of the Act, and any
intrusion must be weighed against the public interest." Id. The Court generally applies a compelling state interest standard to cases dealing with governmental intrusion into individual privacy. See, e.g., Carey, 431 U.S. at 686 (" (Rjegulations imposing a
burden on [a privacy interest] may be justified only by compelling state interests, and
must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests."); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("Broad dissemination by state officials of such information, however, would dearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights, and
would presumably be justified only by compelling state interests."); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. at 153-54 ("At some point in pregnancy, these [government] interests become
sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion
decision.").
The federal circuit courts seem to have adopted a standard lower than the "compelling" state interest standard articulated by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Fraternal
Order of Police, 812 F.2d at 110 ("Most circuits appear to apply an 'intermediate standard of review' for the majority of confidentiality violations . . . with a compelling
interest analysis reserved for 'severe intrusions' on confidentiality.").
169 See Carey, 431 U.S. at 686 (" [R] egulations imposing a burden on a [privacy interest] . .. must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests."); cf Denver Policemen's Protective Ass'n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1981) (in
determining whether governmental intrusion may be made, courts must consider
whether "disclosure can be made in the least intrusive manner").
170 Doe v. Poritz, 142 NJ. 1, 78, 662 A2d 367, 406 (1995).
171

NJ.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2C:7-4(b) (1)

172 Id. § 2C:7-4(b) (2).

(West 1995).
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tended, and a description of the offender's vehicle, including the
17 3
license plate number.
Relying on this existing case law, the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Doe v. Poritz commenced its privacy inquiry with the
threshold question of whether the registration provision impinges
on any expectation of privacy held by sex offenders.1 74 After analyzing each item of information required for registration, the Doe
majority held that sex offenders do not have a privacy interest in
the information. 7 5
First, the court found that an individual does not have an expectation of privacy in information that is available on the public
record, such as prior criminal history, age, address, and vehicle description.1 76 Additionally, the court concluded that the descriptive
Attorney General Guidelines, supra note 52, at 13.
Doe, 142 NJ. at 78, 662 A.2d at 406.
Id. at 79-81, 662 A.2d at 407-08. While the Doe court considered registration
separately from notification, the federal court in Artway v. Attorney General of NewJersey
analyzed the effect disclosure would have on registration information. See Artway v.
Attorney General of New Jersey, 867 F. Supp. 666, 683 (D.NJ. 1995) (noting that
personal matters subject to registration are entwined with the notification provisions
of Megan's Law); cf Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (upholding a New York
statute requiring registration of certain prescription drugs sold at pharmacies).
In the Whalen decision, the Court emphasized the fact that the registered information would not be disclosed. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. In a concurrence, Justice
Brennan warned that "[b ] road dissemination by state officials ...would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights, and would presumably be justified only
by compelling state interests." Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).
176 Doe, 142 NJ. 79, 80, 662 A.2d at 407. In making this determination, the court
relied on several federal court decisions holding that an individual has no constitutionally-protected expectation of privacy in "matters of public record." Id. (citing Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1995); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d
264, 268 (2d Cir. 1994); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193-94 (4th Cir.
1990); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 117 (3d Cir.
1987)).
As to the criminal records, the court based its decision on the fact that NewJersey
guarantees public access to all court records. Id. at 79, 662 A.2d at 407 (citing NJ. CT.
R. 1:38). Additionally, the court noted that in New Jersey, any person may obtain a
complete criminal history on another by contacting the State Police and providing
them with a name, a date of birth or Social Security number, and a $15 fee. Id. (citing
NJ. STAT. ANN. 53:1-20.6 (West Supp. 1995)). The court also revealed that NewJersey
law provides that prior to considering any adult inmate for release, the Parole Board
must notify the local prosecutor's office of each county, police departments, and the
press by releasing the inmate's name, crimes, and place of conviction. Id. at 79-80,
662 A.2d at 407' (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 30:4-123.48(g), 123.45(b)(5) (West 1995)).
Finally, the court indicated that NewJersey law requires that crime victims be notified
of a defendant's release from custody. Id. at 80, 662 A.2d at 407 (citing NJ. STAT.
ANN. 52:4B-44b(21) (West Supp. 1995)).
As far as descriptive information, such as the sex offender's age, legal address,
and vehicle description, the court found that these items are also part of the public
record available through the Division of Motor Vehicles. Id.
173
174
175
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information required at registration, such as a photograph, fingerprints, or description of physical appearance, is not protected because individuals cannot possess an expectation of privacy interest
177
in matters exposed to public view.
The court next turned to the question of whether Tiers Two
or Three sex offenders have a reasonable and protectable expectation of privacy in the information released to the public pursuant
to the notification provisions.17 Following an analysis similar to
that applied to the registration provision, the court appraised each
item of information to be disclosed and concluded that when considered individually, no constitutionally-protected right to privacy
applied to any one item, with the possible exception being the offender's home address. 179 The court determined that the release
of information contained in the offender's criminal records does
not infringe on an offender's right to privacy.1 ° The majority also
concluded that dissemination of the offender's photograph and
physical description does not rise to a violation of the offender's
privacy rights because matters exposed to public view are not protected. 181 Nevertheless, the court focused on the dissemination of
the offender's home address and the impact of the information
subject to release as a whole, and concluded that the notification
18 2
provision may infringe upon an offender's right to privacy.
After concluding that the notification provision implicates a
privacy interest, the court turned to the question of whether the
177 Id. at 80-81, 662 A.2d at 407. The court relied on several United States Supreme
Court cases addressing the Fourth Amendment in reaching this determination. Id.
(citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291,
295 (1973); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
178 Id. at 81, 662 A.2d at 408.
179 Id. at 82, 662 A.2d at 408.
180 Id. at 81, 662 A.2d at 408 (relying on Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)
(holding that government disclosure of arrest record does not impinge defendant's
right to privacy); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (determining that disclosure of information from judicial proceedings does not violate right
to privacy); Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1991) (declaring that release of information in police report does not violate right to privacy),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992)).
181 Doe, 142 N.J. at 82, 662 A.2d at 408.
182 Id. at 82-83, 662 A.2d at 408-09. The court specifically stated:
In this case, where as a result of the information disclosed under the
Notification Law, plaintiff may be exposed to uninvited harassment, we
conclude that disclosure of plaintiff's home address, particularly when
coupled with the other information disclosed, implicates a privacy
interest.
Id. at 84, 662 A.2d at 409.
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state's interest justifies disclosure.""3 Applying a balancing test developed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,1 8 4 the court held
that the notification provision could be justified because the state
has a substantial interest in protecting society from the dangers of
recidivism by sex offenders.1 8 5 The court recognized that the
clinical knowledge regarding sex offender recidivism is highly disputed, but stated that the Legislature can justifiably address an important societal problem based on the information available at the
time."' Although finding that the offender has a privacy interest
in the totality of the information released through community notification, the court surmised that the offender's expectation of privacy is diminished because most of the information released is
available on the public record and, therefore, individual items of
information are not protected. 7 Additionally, the court noted
that the scope of disclosure via notification is "carefully calibrated"
to meet the state interest.188 Finally, the court concluded that the
state's interest in protecting the public outweighed the sex offender's privacy interest."l 9
C. Deprivation of ProceduralDue Process

As enacted, Megan's Law provides for tier classification of a
sex offender and community notification based on the county prosecutor's determination, without providing the sex offender with
notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to classification and
possible community notification. 9 Whether Megan's Law violates
the requirements of procedural due process turns on whether the
tier classification and the potential community notification im183 Id. at 87, 662 A.2d at 411.
184 Id. at 87-88, 662 A.2d at 411 (citing United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980)). The court reported that the following factors must

be considered:
(1) the type of record requested; (2) the information it does or might

contain; (3) the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual
disclosure; (4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which
the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent
unauthorized disclosure; (6) the degree of need for access; and (7)

whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy,
or other recognized public interest militating toward access.
Id. (quoting Faison v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 1198, 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
185 Doe, 142 N.J. at 88-89, 662 A.2d at 412.
186 Id., 662 A.2d at 411-12.
187 Id. at 88, 662 A.2d at 411.
188 Id. at 89, 662 A.2d at 412.
189 Id. at 90-91, 662 A.2d at 412-13. The court determined that the New Jersey
Constitution requires a similar result. Id.
190 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(d).
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pinges upon a constitutionally-protected right of the offender. 91
Sex offenders claim that notice and a hearing are required
because the law implicates their privacy interest.1 92 The NewJersey
Supreme Court agreed, and held in Doe that the lack-of procedural
due process requires judicial review of the tier classification and of
the proposed manner of Tier Two and Three notification.1 93 Judicial review, the court declared, is to be accomplished through summary proceedings conducted prior to notification upon request by
1 94
the sex offender.

The court mandated that the Attorney General Guidelines be
modified to provide for written notice to offenders regarding proposed tier classifications and the manner of notification.' 95 The
court further stated that the notice must provide the offender with
adequate time to object.1 96 Moreover, the court required that the
notice specifically inform the offender about the right to a judicial
hearing; that notification will proceed unless the offender exercises such right within the specified date; and that notification will
not be made if the offender exercises the right to a hearing by
making timely application unless the court, after a hearing, approves the notification. 9 The majority also dictated that the written notification must advise the offender of the right to counsel, 9 '
of the procedure for applying for judicial review, and of the impor191 See Doe, 142 N.J. at 99, 662 A.2d at 417 (describing the test to be applied in a
procedural due process context).
192 Id. at 100, 662 A.2d at 417.
193 Id. Although upholding the constitutionality of Megan's Law, the court determined that the statute's provisions sufficiently impinge upon sex offenders' liberties
to "trigger both procedural due process and the fairness doctrine in [New Jersey]."
Id. at 30, 662 A.2d at 382.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. The court stated that notice must provide the offender with a minimum twoweek period in which to respond and apply for a hearing. Id. The court allowed the
prosecutor to retain some flexibility, stating that: "We realize that in some cases it
may be impossible as a practical matter to give such notice, or to give it timely, and in
those cases it maybe dispensed with." Id.
197 Id. at 30-32, 662 A.2d at 382-83.
198 Id. at 31, 662 A.2d at 382. As in a criminal trial, the presiding court will provide
counsel if the offender cannot afford an attorney. Id. The requirement that the offender be provided with counsel has become the new issue of contention for the
implementation of Megan's Law. See Dana Coleman, Pro Bono Constitutional Attack
Brews, N.J. LAw., Oct. 30, 1995, at 1, 16 (describing the controversy arising from the
requirement that sex offenders be represented pro bono at notification hearings). The
court apparently anticipated these problems, however, and "strongly suggest[ed] that
legislation providing for representation be adopted." Doe, 142 N.J. at 31, 662 A.2d at
382.
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tance of filing such an application in a timely manner. 19 9
In addition to requiring written notice to the sex offender, the
New Jersey Supreme Court also promulgated procedures to be followed by courts conducting Megan's Law hearings.2 00 The Doe
court established that after receiving the offender's objection to
either tier classification or manner of notification, the presiding
court first must set the date for the summary hearing and decision 20 1 and appoint counsel for the sex offender if necessary.20 2
Additionally, the Doe court mandated that the prosecutor turn over
all materials and documents, including the prosecutor's findings
and statements of reason for the tier classification and proposed
manner of notification. 0 3 The court granted the presiding trial
court full control over the summary hearing, which must be conducted in camera.20 4 The Doe court further stipulated that the trial
court is not required to apply the rules of evidence and has discretion as to the production of witnesses, cross-examination, and the
use of experts.20 5
The majority also dictated the consequences of the summary
hearing.2 °6 If the trial court affirms the prosecutor's decision, then
public notification may proceed.20 7 If, however, the court reverses
the prosecutor's decision, notification may only proceed after compliance with the court's decision.20 8 The Doe court also provided
that in the event that the trial court affirms the prosecutorial decision, the offender is not automatically entitled to a stay of notification, although a stay may be granted if justified by the
circumstances.2

°9

To ensure the uniform application of Megan's Law, the New
Jersey Supreme Court required that a threejudge panel be established to review all such judicial hearings. 2 10 Additionally, the Doe
majority required that a bench manual be designed 21 1 and that the
Administrative Office of the Courts publish an annual report to
199 Id. The court envisioned a "simple letter" as the required form of application by
the offender. Id.
200 Id. at 31-32, 662 A.2d at 382-83.
20] Id. at 31, 662 A.2d at 382.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 31-32, 662 A.2d at 383.
207 Id. at 32, 662 A.2d at 383.
208 Id. at 31-32, 662 A.2d at 383.
209 Id. at 32, 662 A.2d at 383.
210 Id. at 39, 662 A.2d at 386.
211 Id.
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keep the public informed about the number and disposition of
Megan's Law hearings.2 12
C. Equal Protection
The third major claim asserted by sex offenders is that
Megan's Law violates their right to equal protection.2 1 3 The guiding principle of equal protection is that similarly situated people
should be treated similarly. 214 . The United States Supreme Court
has long held that classifications by a state are not per se unconstitutional; rather, they become so only if they are arbitrary and without a rational legal basis. 2 15 When a classification does not impact
a suspect class or involve fundamental rights, the courts generally
will uphold the classification if the law is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 2 16 The United States Supreme
Court has respected the separation of powers by liberally construing the rational basis test respecting the separation of powers and
upholding classifications if the government action is supported by
2 17
plausible reasons.
The Doe court followed this rational basis analysis in holding
that Megan's Law does not offend equal protection.2 1 8 The Doe
majority rejected the claim that equal protection requires the law
to view offenders as individuals rather than as a class. 2 19 The court
commenced its equal protection analysis by noting that equal protection does not proscribe classifications, but simply requires that
the classification not be arbitrary. 2 ° Next, the court stated that
classifications that neither target a suspect class nor encroach upon
a fundamental right need only have a rational relation to the pur212 Id. The court suggested that the notice and hearing scheme designed in Doe
may be altered by the Legislature so long as procedural due process requirements are
satisfied. Id. at 39-40, 662 A.2d at 387.
213 Id. at 91, 662 A.2d at 413. The Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution states, in relevant part, that "nor [shall any State] deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
214 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
215 Id. at 440; see also United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 95 (1950) (explaining
that only arbitrary and unjustified discriminatory treatment violates equal protection); Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (noting that equal
protection only prohibits treatment that is arbitrary and without legal basis).
216 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (describing the rational basis test). The party challenging the legislation has the burden of proving that the legislation is arbitrary and
with no rational basis. Id. at 339-40.
217 Id. at 441-42; see also F.C.C. v. Beach Comms., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993)
(applying rational basis review to overturn FCC cable television regulation).
218 Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 91-95, 662 A.2d 367, 413-15 (1995).
219 Id. at 91, 662 A.2d at 413.
220

Id.
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pose sought by the state.2 21 After finding that the classification of
sex offenders into tiers neither impacts a suspect class nor impinges a fundamental constitutional right,2 2 2 the majority held that
Megan's Law does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because
classification as a sex offender is legitimately based on the offender's conviction or adjudication for enumerated sex offenses.2 2 3
IV.

CONCLUSION

The national problem of sex offender recidivism and the inadequacy of the existing laws has demanded legislative response. In
enacting Megan's Law, the New Jersey Legislature relied on data
indicating that sex offenders as a group have a high rate of recidivism and that treatment is not efficacious.2 2 4 Highly publicized
and heinous crimes committed by habitual sex offenders, in many
cases neighbors of the victims, corroborate this statistical data.2 2 5
The NewJersey Legislature-perhaps realizing that the permanent
and devastating harm inflicted by sex offenders impacts not only
the individual victims and their families but society as well-over226

whelmingly adopted Megan's Law.

The registration and notification provisions of Megan's Law
provide a rational response to the dangers of sex offender recidivism. Megan's Law, particularly through notification, enhances
public safety by informing parents that a potentially dangerous person lives in their neighborhood, consequently allowing parents to
take common sense preventive measures to protect themselves and
their children. Megan's Law tips the balance in favor of the innocent victims of sex crimes rather than the perpetrators. The court
and the Legislature expressed heightened sensitivity to the balancing of interests that inevitably must occur when societal preservaId. at 92, 662 A.2d at 413.
Id. at 92-93, 662 A.2d at 414.
Id. at 95, 662 A.2d at 415. The court found that "the registration and notification requirements are rationally related to [the] legitimate state interest" of protecting the public from convicted sex offenders and must therefore be upheld. Id. at 93,
662 A.2d at 414.
224 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (providing legislative findings and statement of purpose for Megan's Law); see also supra notes 66, 88-93 and accompanying text (discussing the recidivism and treatment data relied on by legislatures in enacting sex
offender statutes).
225 See supra notes 1-6, 17, 24 and accompanying text (describing the nationwide
public response to sex crimes by habitual offenders).
226 Mendez, Measures Go to Governo, supranote 1, at 1, 18. Only one negative vote
was cast on any of the seven measures passed by the New Jersey Assembly. Id. at 18.
The notification provisions passed unanimously; several legislators abstained in order
to avoid casting negative votes. Id. at 1, 18.
221
222
223
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tion conflicts with the rights of the individual. Megan's Law is a
pragmatic response to an intractable and painful problem. It may
not be a panacea, but it is the best of the available alternatives.
Had Megan's parents known that Jesse Timmendequas was a convicted sex offender, they could have informed their children about
the dangers posed by such a person, perhaps avoiding the tragedy
of Megan's murder.
Opponents of Megan's Law claim that registration and notification constitute punishment because the law deprives a small
group of offenders of their anonymity and could potentially subject
them to ostracism, harassment, or vigilantism.2 2 7 Besides the speculative nature of such a claim, these opponents disregard Megan's
Law's purpose as a purely regulatory measure to protect society. 2 8
Any unpleasant consequences that sex offenders may suffer will not
flow directly from Megan's Law, but, rather, from public reaction
to the offenders' criminal history. Rather than promoting vigilantism or witch hunts, Megan's Law was designed to arm citizens with
public knowledge of potentially dangerous criminals that had previously been difficult to obtain. The Attorney General has made it
clear that in implementing the law, anyone involved in vigilantism
or harassment will be prosecuted. 2 9
Without abandoning its constitutional moorings, the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Doe v. Poritz ventured into uncharted waters to uphold Megan's Law, a necessary and timely piece of legislation that allows society to protect itself from repetitive sex
offenders. By carefully refining the notification provisions and
providing forjudicial review of tier classification, the court struck a
balance between offenders' rights and societal interests. The court
appropriately interpreted the constitutional provisions protecting
individual liberty, dignity, and freedom so as not to convert them
into obstacles for preventing the enactment of laws that are free of
punitive intent and designed solely to protect society. Despite the
potentially severe impact that registration and notification may
have on the lives of sex offenders, the law as interpreted and upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court remains within constitutional bounds.
Elga A. Goodman
227 See Doe, 142 N.J. at 77, 662 A.2d at 406 (dismissing arguments that Megan's Law
is inextricably linked to public stigma and ostracism).
228 See id. at 73, 75, 662 A.2d at 404, 405 (holding that the sole purpose and effect
of Megan's Law is regulatory, with the intent to protect society from the threat of
habitual sex offenders).
229 Attorney General Guidelines, supra note 52, at 13.
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SEX OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE

Low Risk

Criteria

0

Moderate
Risk

1

High Risk

3

Comments

Total

Seriousness of Offense x5
1. Degree of
Force

no physical
force; no
threats

threats; minor physical
force

violent; use
of weapon;
significant
victim
harm

2. Degree of
Contact

no contact;
fondling
over clothing

fondling
under clothing

penetration

13-17

under 13

3. Age of Vic- 18 or over
I
tim

_

Subtotal:
Offense History x3
4. Victim Selection

household/
family
member

5. Number of first known
offense/vicOffenses/
tim
Victims

acquaintance

stranger

two known
offenses/victims

three or
more offenses/victims

6. Duration
of Offensive Behavior

less than 1
year

1 to 2 years

over 2
years

7. Length of
Time
Since Last
Offense

5 or more
years

more than 1
but less than
5 years

1 year or
less

8. History of
Anti-Social
Acts

no history

limited history

extensive
history
Subtotal:

Characteristics of Offender x2
9. Response
to Treatment

good progress

limited progress

prior unsuccessful
treatment
or no progress in
current
treatment

10. Substance
Abuse

no history
of abuse

in remission

not in remission
Subtotal:

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

802
Community Support xl
11. Therapeutic Support

current/
continued
involvement in
therapy

intermittent

no involvement

12. Residential
Support

supportive/
supervised
setting, appropriate
location

stable and
appropriate
location but
no external
support system

problematic location
and/or unstable; isolated

13. Employment/Educational
Stability

stable and
appropriate

intermittent
but appropriate

inappropriate or
none
Subtotal:
Total:

Scoring:

Highest possible total score = 111
Moderate Range: 37-73
Low Range: 0-36

High Range 74-11

